China’s high-end consumption market was worth 1.56 trillion RMB in 2025, down 5% on the year (Hurun Research Institute, 2026 Hurun Chinese Luxury Consumer Survey, published 30 January 2026). At 7.15 RMB to the US dollar, that is about 218 billion USD. The number matters less than what sits inside it. Watches fell 14% to 17%. Leather goods fell 8% to 11%. High-end consumer electronics grew 5%, and wearables inside that grew 22%. Wealthy Chinese buyers did not stop spending. They moved the money.
This report sizes the market, tracks where the spending went, and names the brands that captured it. I look at four winners, three of them selling technical performance or craft rather than a logo, and I explain what a smaller brand can copy and what it cannot. Then I set out what I would do with a first China budget in 2026, and where the evidence is thin.
Five figures to take into your next meeting
- 1.56 trillion RMB: size of China’s high-end consumption market in 2025, down 5% year on year (Hurun Research Institute, 30 January 2026).
- Minus 10% against plus 12%: Chinese high net worth individuals plan to cut annual spending on material goods such as watches and jewellery by 10%, and raise spending on services and experiences such as travel, health and education by 12% (Hurun Research Institute, 30 January 2026).
- Minus 14% to minus 17%: the drop in mainland China watch sales in 2025, against beauty at plus 4% to plus 7%, the only category in growth (Bain and Company, 2025 China Personal Luxury Report, 29 January 2026).
- Plus 43.4%: Amer Sports revenue growth in Greater China in 2025, to 1.862 billion USD, driven by Arc’teryx and Salomon (Amer Sports full-year 2025 results).
- 105 billion RMB: China’s high-end consumer electronics market in 2025, up 5%, with wearable devices up 22% (Hurun Research Institute, 30 January 2026).
The questions brands actually ask me
These are the six questions I get in a first meeting, in the order they usually arrive.
Is the Chinese luxury market still shrinking in 2026?
No, but the recovery is uneven and category-dependent. The trends section below gives the Bain and Roland Berger forecasts side by side.
If logo goods are declining, what is growing?
Technical performance wear, craft-led jewellery, experience services and high-end electronics. See the market trends and benchmark sections.
Do I need a mainland entity or can I sell cross-border?
Both work in 2026, and the choice depends on your average price and repurchase rate. The e-commerce part of the solutions block covers the trade-off.
Is Xiaohongshu enough, or do I need Douyin too?
Wealthy Chinese buyers use both to research products. The consumer analysis section shows the purchase path and the social section says which one to start with.
How much of my Chinese revenue will show up outside China?
About a third, and that changes how you read your own P&L. The constraints part of the trends section has the split.
What does a serious first year cost?
The solutions block gives real starting budgets by channel, based on what we actually spend for clients.
What changed in the China luxury market in 2025 and 2026
The decline slowed sharply, and 2026 turns positive
Mainland China personal luxury sales fell 3% to 5% in 2025, a much smaller drop than the 17% to 19% collapse of 2024 (Bain and Company, 29 January 2026). Bain saw stabilisation from the third quarter of 2025 and expects modest growth in 2026. Roland Berger is more precise and more optimistic: 3% to 6% growth for China’s luxury market in 2026, then 5% to 7% a year over the following five years (Foresight 2026: China Industry Trends, 14 January 2026). Take the range, not one number. Two respected houses, two different methods, both pointing up.
The categories that carry a logo are the categories that fell
This is the single most useful table in this report. Read down the column and the thesis writes itself.
| Category | Mainland China sales change, 2025 | What it is bought for |
|---|---|---|
| Beauty and personal care | +4% to +7% | Routine, self-care, low ticket |
| Jewellery | 0% to -5% | Craft and gold value |
| Fashion and apparel | -5% to -8% | Mixed |
| Leather goods | -8% to -11% | Visible status |
| Watches | -14% to -17% | Visible status |
| Second-hand luxury | +15% to +20% | Value and access |
Source: Bain and Company, 2025 China Personal Luxury Report, 29 January 2026.
The two worst performing categories are the two you wear to be seen. The best performing new category, beauty, is the one nobody else sees you buy. Second-hand grew 15% to 20% and still represents under 10% of the primary luxury market, so it is a competitor rather than a replacement (Bain, January 2026). I wrote more on that pressure in our piece on second-hand as a challenge for fashion brands in China.
Where the money went instead: services, technology and experience
Hurun surveyed 470 Chinese individuals with more than 10 million RMB in assets, including 70 with more than 100 million RMB. Average assets were 61 million RMB, average age 36, and 78% lived in tier-1 cities. Their stated spending plans are blunt.
| Sub-market of China high-end consumption | Size, 2025 | Change on 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Luxury vehicles (over 500,000 RMB) | 570 billion RMB | -8% |
| Traditional luxury goods | 430 billion RMB | Watches -14%, jewellery -8% |
| Premium spirits and tea | 300 billion RMB | -6% |
| High-end consumer electronics | 105 billion RMB | +5%, wearables +22% |
| Total high-end consumption | 1.56 trillion RMB | -5% |
Source: Hurun Research Institute, 2026 Hurun Chinese Luxury Consumer Survey, 30 January 2026. Vehicle threshold as defined in the report.
The experience side is not a survey intention, it is booked revenue. China’s commercial live performance box office reached 61.655 billion RMB in 2025, up 6.39%, with 194 million admissions, up 4.22% (China Association of Performing Arts, 13 January 2026). Large concerts alone took 29.558 billion RMB, up 13.7%, with attendance up 30.8%. The association estimates that large events pulled more than 220 billion RMB of additional spending on transport, hotels, dining and shopping.
Your competitor for a 15,000 RMB handbag is now a weekend in Chengdu with two concert tickets.
The constraint nobody puts in the deck: a third of your Chinese revenue lands abroad
In 2025, 65% of Chinese luxury spending happened in mainland China and 35% happened overseas (Bain and Company, 29 January 2026). Daigou platform sales grew only 3% in 2025, down from 5% in 2024, so the grey channel is fading rather than exploding. But if you judge China on your mainland P&L alone, you are looking at roughly two thirds of your Chinese customer. Price gaps between Shanghai, Paris and Tokyo drive that split, which is why we treat China luxury pricing against Paris and Tokyo as a strategy question, not a finance one.
Four brands that are winning, and what they actually did
Arc’teryx and Salomon: performance specs beat heritage badges
Amer Sports, which owns Arc’teryx and Salomon, took 1.862 billion USD in Greater China in 2025, growth of 43.4%. In the first quarter of 2026 the region delivered 645 million USD, up 44.5%, and 33% of group revenue. By the second quarter of 2026, Greater China at 556 million USD was larger than the Americas at 497 million USD. The company raised its full-year 2026 revenue guidance twice, ending at 24% growth.
Why it worked: Arc’teryx sells a membrane, a seam count and a temperature rating. The buyer can verify the claim. The stores are staffed by people who climb, and the flagship formats give customers something to do rather than something to look at. Hurun’s 2026 survey named Arc’teryx the most popular brand among high net worth respondents for hiking, Lululemon for yoga and Adidas for running.
What a smaller brand can copy: the specification. Publish real numbers about the product, in Chinese, and let a customer check them. What you cannot copy: fourteen years of technical credibility. Do not claim performance you cannot document, because Xiaohongshu comment sections test it.
Lululemon: comfort sold through community, not campaigns
Lululemon’s mainland China net revenue grew 29% in fiscal 2025, lifting China from 13% to 16% of global net revenue. Third quarter mainland growth was 46%. The brand reached 172 stores in mainland China by early 2026 and put most of its roughly 46 new global stores that year in China.
Why it worked: the ambassador and in-store class model turns a shop into a weekly appointment. The product promise is physical comfort, which is a claim a customer confirms on her own body within a week. No status decoding required. We covered the category economics in detail in our China premium athleisure market report for 2026.
What a smaller brand can copy: the recurring local event. Twenty people in a Shanghai studio every Saturday costs very little and produces the user photography you need. What you cannot copy: 172 doors.
Laopu Gold: craft and scarcity, at Hermes-level store productivity
Chinese jeweller Laopu Gold reported 27.303 billion RMB of revenue in 2025, up 220% on 8.506 billion RMB in 2024, with net profit of 5.029 billion RMB, up 234.9%. It did that from 45 self-operated stores in 16 cities. Offline stores produced 82.9% of revenue, 22.646 billion RMB, which is more than 500 million RMB per store per year.
Why it worked: Laopu prices by piece, not by gram, refuses discounting, and sells a documented ancient-method (古法) goldsmithing technique. Customers queue by appointment. The store is the product experience. This is the closest thing in China to proof that craft narrative plus scarcity beats logo licensing.
What a smaller brand can copy: the refusal to discount and the appointment model. What you cannot copy: a Chinese heritage story, if you do not have one. Do not invent one.
Huawei-powered EVs: the clearest evidence that technology beat the badge
In Hurun’s 2026 survey, Huawei-backed electric vehicles overtook the traditional German luxury three for the first time as the preferred car among Chinese high net worth respondents (Hurun Research Institute, 30 January 2026). McKinsey’s 2026 China Auto Consumer Insights, published 12 May 2026, quantifies the shift: technology innovation now influences 20.7% of purchase decisions, close to double the previous year; 84% of respondents expect a proactive AI assistant in the cabin; 69% treat urban assisted driving as standard equipment rather than an option.
Why it matters to a fashion brand: the same buyer, at the same income, chose a spec sheet over a badge in the most status-loaded category China has. That is the thesis of this report, measured.
| Brand | China result | Period | What it sells |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amer Sports (Arc’teryx, Salomon) | 1.862bn USD, +43.4% | Full year 2025, Greater China | Verifiable technical performance |
| Lululemon | +29%, 16% of global revenue | Fiscal 2025, mainland China | Physical comfort plus community |
| Laopu Gold | 27.3bn RMB, +220%, 45 stores | Full year 2025 | Craft, scarcity, store ritual |
| Huawei-backed EVs | First above the German luxury three among HNW buyers | Hurun survey, January 2026 | Technology and in-car experience |
Who is buying, why, and where they look first
The three segments that decide your China plan
The Hurun panel gives a clean picture of the top segment: average age 36, average assets 61 million RMB, 78% in tier-1 cities, 53% female. This is not an older generation buying trophies. It is a young, urban, mostly female group whose economic confidence index sat at 5.4 out of 10.
Below them sits the affluent middle, the buyer of entry luxury. Tapestry reported 37% growth in Greater China in its fiscal 2026 second quarter, with Coach buyers concentrated in the 25 to 35 age band, and Tmall reported new-product sales up more than 70% year on year in the third quarter of 2025 (reported by Jing Daily, 2026). This band, roughly 2,000 to 8,000 RMB, is where volume lives.
Third, the experience buyer, who may hold both of the above wallets and simply reallocates. The direction of travel is here.
| Spending category | Net intention to increase, 2026 |
|---|---|
| Travel | +58% |
| Health management | +41% |
| Gold as an investment | +15% |
| Children’s education | +13% |
| Everyday luxury goods | -33% |
| Real estate | -21% |
Source: Hurun Research Institute, 30 January 2026, net intention among 470 high net worth respondents.
The real purchase path, and where AI now sits inside it
Hurun found that Chinese high net worth consumers get product information mainly from Xiaohongshu and Douyin, and that their most-used AI assistants are DeepSeek and Doubao (30 January 2026). That second finding is the one most European brands have not absorbed. A Chinese buyer now asks a domestic model a question about your brand before she reaches a search box, and the answer is assembled from Chinese-language sources you may not have.
The sequence we observe with clients: discovery on Xiaohongshu or Douyin, verification through an AI assistant or Baidu, comparison across notes and reviews, purchase on Tmall, a Douyin livestream or a WeChat mini-program, then repurchase inside WeChat.
Seasonality and the price bands that sell
618 in June and Double 11 in November remain the volume peaks. Chinese New Year is now the design peak: more than 200 luxury brands launched Year of the Horse products before the 2026 holiday, a record (reported by Jing Daily). Women’s Day on 8 March is the strongest single self-purchase moment for premium fashion and beauty. Rational buying is the default rest of the year, and Bain describes 2025 Chinese consumers as measurably more rational and trading down within brands rather than out of them.
What this means for a foreign brand, plainly. If your product is bought to be seen, the market moved against you and you will spend more to sell less. If your product can be verified by the buyer, on her body or on a spec sheet, you have a better 2026 than you had a 2024. And if you cannot explain your product in Chinese, in text, on a Chinese platform, an AI assistant will explain it for you, badly.
What to actually do with a first China budget in 2026
Social media: start on Xiaohongshu, and buy proof rather than reach
The mechanism on Xiaohongshu is search, not feed. A user types a category or a problem, reads eight to fifteen notes, and forms a shortlist. So the job is to own the shortlist. That means volume of credible first-person notes with your product named in the text, not one expensive celebrity post. We seed 60 to 100 KOC notes over three months, add three to five mid-tier KOL for credibility, and only then put paid behind the notes that already earned saves and comments.
A realistic starting budget from our own client work: 150,000 to 250,000 RMB over three months for seeding and production, before paid amplification. Douyin comes second for fashion, and it comes with a different job, which is short video that shows the product moving on a body. Our detail on both sits on the Xiaohongshu marketing and KOL and KOC pages.
E-commerce: cross-border first, local entity when repurchase justifies it
Tmall Global lets you sell without a Chinese company, a Chinese trademark registration in every class, or a mainland licence. Goods ship from a bonded warehouse or direct from origin, and the customer pays cross-border duty inside the checkout price. It is the right first step for an average basket above roughly 1,500 RMB.
You move to a local entity and a domestic Tmall or JD store when repurchase rate rises, because cross-border delivery of five to twelve days kills a second purchase, and because a Douyin store and most livestream formats work far better with domestic stock. That move costs you a WFOE or a trading partner, mainland trademark protection, product registration where required, and a local warehouse. Do not do it in year one on hope. We map that decision on the China e-commerce page.
Digital marketing: Baidu, generative answers, and the WeChat file you own
Three layers, in this order. Baidu still answers the comparison and reassurance queries, so you need Chinese-language pages that carry your brand name, your category, your price positioning and your service terms.
Then generative answers. When a buyer asks DeepSeek, Doubao, Kimi or Yuanbao about your brand, those models draw on Chinese text: your own site, Baidu Baike, Zhihu, media coverage, Xiaohongshu notes. If that text does not exist, the model improvises or names a competitor. Getting cited is now a content operation, and it is what our generative engine optimisation work does.
Third, WeChat. Every platform above rents you an audience. A WeChat official account, a mini-program store and a CRM tagged by purchase and by size is the only Chinese customer file you own. For a premium brand, second-year profit comes from that file, not from new acquisition. See the WeChat agency page for how the private domain is built.
Questions I get after the numbers
Should I delay China entry until the market grows again?
Bain expects modest growth in 2026 and Roland Berger forecasts 3% to 6%. Entering during a flat year is cheaper: KOC rates, retail rents and platform incentives are all softer than they were in 2021. Waiting for a confirmed rebound means paying rebound prices.
Is gold jewellery a status purchase, which would contradict this report?
Partly, and I will not pretend otherwise. Laopu Gold sells prestige. But the buyer is paying for documented technique and store ritual, and 82.9% of revenue comes from physical stores where the experience is the sale. The gram price is available anywhere.
How long before the first meaningful sales?
With cross-border and a seeded Xiaohongshu presence, six to nine months to a repeatable monthly number. Anyone promising three months is selling you a livestream, not a brand.
Where is the evidence thin?
Channel split. No institute publishes a reliable, primary-sourced breakdown of Chinese luxury sales across Tmall, JD, Douyin, Xiaohongshu and offline for 2026. Figures circulating at 46% online come from aggregators without a traceable original report, so I have left them out.
Sources
- Hurun Research Institute, 2026 Hurun Chinese Luxury Consumer Survey, published 30 January 2026. Gives the 1.56 trillion RMB market size, the sub-market breakdown, the material versus experience spending intentions, and the brand preferences of 470 high net worth respondents.
- Bain and Company, 2025 China Personal Luxury Report, published 29 January 2026. Source for the category-by-category 2025 performance, the 65% domestic and 35% overseas split, daigou growth and the second-hand market.
- China Association of Performing Arts, 2025 national live performance market briefing, published 13 January 2026. Provides the 61.655 billion RMB box office, concert growth and the spillover spending estimate that sizes the experience economy.
- McKinsey Greater China, 2026 China Auto Consumer Insights, published 12 May 2026. Quantifies how far technology and in-use experience have displaced brand badge in China’s most status-driven category.
For the service architecture behind everything above, see our luxury full-service agency page for China.
About the author
I am Cindy Zhang, CEO of Fashion China Agency in Shanghai. I spent years as chief editorial and PR officer at Vogue China, watched the logo cycle peak from the brand side at Guerlain, then ran luxury accounts at Xiaohongshu, which is where I saw the shift in this report happen in search data before it appeared in any institute’s PDF. More on my background here.
Fashion China Agency, and one brand we took through this
We work only with premium and luxury fashion, jewellery and accessory brands entering or rebuilding in China. Typically that is a European house with 10 to 200 million EUR of global revenue, no mainland entity yet, and a founder who wants to understand the market before committing. If you want a read on your own category, write to us and we will tell you honestly whether it is worth it.
An anonymised example, not an official case study, since the client has not approved being named. A family-owned European leather goods house, average price around 2,600 RMB, came to us in 2024 after two years of daigou-driven sales it could not see or control. We stopped the logo-forward creative entirely and rebuilt the Chinese content around tannery sourcing, stitch count and repair service, all documented in Chinese. Seeding ran at about 80 KOC notes per quarter on Xiaohongshu. We opened Tmall Global rather than a local entity, because the repurchase rate did not justify a WFOE. Eighteen months later, Chinese-language search volume for the brand name had risen from near zero to a stable monthly base, and the mainland store was covering its own operating cost with a repeat purchase rate above 20%. The change that mattered was not the media plan. It was deciding to sell the workshop instead of the monogram.